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SEC V. DOROZHKO’S AFFIRMATIVE 
MISREPRESENTATION THEORY OF  
INSIDER TRADING: AN IMPROPER  
MEANS TO A PROPER END 
Historically, prosecution under Section 10(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 has been limited to cases of nondisclosure fraud 
involving breach of a fiduciary duty to the corporation, its shareholders, 
or the source of the material nonpublic information.  Some legal scholars 
criticize the limited scope of this law, arguing that it creates a loophole 
through which persons may trade on stolen material nonpublic 
information without fear of prosecution.   
Bringing this issue to the forefront was a 2009 case, SEC v. 
Dorozhko, involving a Ukrainian citizen who hacked into a company’s 
secure computer network where he accessed corporate financials prior to 
their release.  In its opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals greatly 
extended the reach of the SEC’s policing power by adopting a new theory 
of insider, which eliminates the fiduciary duty requirement in cases 
involving an affirmative misrepresentation rather than a nondisclosure.  
In light of the court’s unprecedented holding, this note examines the 
second circuit’s approach, arguing that the Circuit impermissibly 
combined two distinct theories of securities fraud.  Notwithstanding the 
second circuit’s flawed approach, this note goes on to argue that computer 
hacking carried out in connection with securities trades should be 
condemned by the securities laws under the fraud on the investor theory 
of insider trading as a matter of public policy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Trading on material nonpublic information continues to be a hot-
button issue on Wall Street as investors are continually searching for 
and trading on informational advantages.1  With corporate America 
 
1. Susan Pulliam et al., U.S. in Vast Insider Trading Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2010, at 
A1. 
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becoming increasingly digitalized, outsiders are finding new ways to 
obtain an informational advantage, such as hacking into secured 
computer networks housing confidential corporate information.2  To 
adapt to these new technological developments and to root out 
fraudulent schemes carried out using the internet, the Securities & 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) established the Office of Internet 
Enforcement (“OIE”) in 1998.3  Since that time, the SEC has identified 
and prosecuted numerous hackers for engaging in fraudulent schemes in 
connection with securities transactions.4 
Congress has never defined insider trading, leaving it to the courts to 
determine the extent of the prohibition.  Guided by only the 1934 
Securities and Exchange Act’s vague prohibition against purchasing or 
selling securities using deceptive devices,5 the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the deception element of insider trading to require a breach 
of a fiduciary duty owed by the trader to either the company, its 
shareholders, or the source of the material nonpublic information.6  If a 
trader owes such a duty, he or she must “disclose or abstain” from 
trading on the nonpublic information.7  As such, historically the SEC 
found only company insiders,8 temporary insiders,9 misappropriators,10 
 
2. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett et al., Nasdaq Confirm Breach in Network, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
7, 2011, at C1. 
3. Press Release, SEC, SEC Creates Office of Internet Enforcement to Battle Online 
Securities Fraud (July 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1998/dig072898. 
pdf.  The SEC restructured the Division of Enforcement in early 2010.  As a result, the Office 
of Internet Enforcement was dissolved.  See Press Release, SEC, SEC Names New 
Specialized Unit Chiefs and Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-5.htm. 
4. Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the CyberSecurities Fraud 
Forum (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch092308tar.htm.  
See, e.g., Blue Bottle Ltd., Litig. Release No. 20018, 90 SEC Docket 268 (Feb. 26, 2007); 
Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, Litig. Release No. 19450, 86 SEC Docket 1591 (Nov. 1, 2005).  
In both cases, the court granted the SEC its requested relief but declined to issue a written 
opinion.  Id.; see also SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that a 
computer hacker could be liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should the lower court 
find that computer hacking is deceptive under the statute). 
5. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78j(a)–(b), 78i(a), 78(k) (2006). 
6. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 660 (1997) (holding that the defendant 
had committed fraud through nondisclosure because the defendant had a duty to disclose to 
the source of the information (his firm) that he would trade on); Chiarella v. United States, 
445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that “a duty to disclose under section 10(b) does not arise 
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information”). 
7. The disclose or abstain rule requires investors who wish to trade on the basis of 
nonpublic information to either disclose such information or abstain from trading altogether.   
8. Corporate insiders include corporate directors, officers, employees, and other 
permanent insiders.  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.  
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and tippees11 liable for insider trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.  Outsiders with no fiduciary duty have avoided liability.12 
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has rejected the parity 
of information approach to insider trading that would prohibit all trades 
made on nonpublic information irrespective of how the information was 
obtained.13  Of course, the SEC has found that such a limitation 
frustrates its ability to regulate the securities market.  To avoid this 
frustration, the SEC has continually sought to expand its regulatory 
power to reach all trades made on informational advantages.14  Despite 
repeated rejections, the SEC has continued to strive for something close 
to parity by chipping away at the Court’s initially narrow interpretation 
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—their latest victory being the Second 
Circuit’s unprecedented decision in SEC v. Dorozhko.15 
In Dorozhko the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
computer hacking may be deemed a “deceptive device” under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, despite the absence of a 
fiduciary duty.16  Criticisms of the decision surfaced immediately, 
especially from legal scholars who interpreted prior Supreme Court 
precedent to foreclose insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 where an outsider owes no fiduciary duty to the company, its 
 
9. Temporary insiders include attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others who 
become temporary fiduciaries of a corporation.  Id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 
n.14 (1983)).     
10. Misappropriators include corporate outsiders who owe a fiduciary duty to the source 
of material nonpublic information, usually a corporate insider.  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53. 
11. A tippee is a person who “assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a 
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has 
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing information to the tippee, and 
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.”  Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.  A 
tippee may also be liable where he receives information from misappropriators or other 
tippees who breach a fiduciary duty of which the tippee is aware or should be aware.  Robert 
A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 263, 296 (1999). 
12. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665–67. 
13. Id. at 656–59; see also Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 232 (1980). 
14. See Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread is the Problem and is There Adequate 
Criminal Enforcement?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 138–139 
(2006) (statement of Linda C. Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC). 
15. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (extending 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 to misappropriators who breach a fiduciary duty to the source of nonpublic 
information); SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2009) (eliminating the fiduciary duty 
requirement in cases involving affirmative misrepresentations rather than nondisclosures). 
16. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51. 
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shareholders, or the source.17  Because computer hackers owe no 
fiduciary duty, their conduct, while punishable under wire fraud and 
computer fraud statutes,18 would not constitute insider trading.19 
Focusing on Dorozhko and computer hacking in general, this Note 
will discuss the development and future of insider trading laws as they 
apply to outsiders owing no fiduciary duty.  To that end, Part II will 
provide a historical background of insider trading law from its common 
law origins to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 in the seminal opinions in Chiarella v. United States,20 Dirks 
v. SEC,21 and United States v. O’Hagan.22  Part III will then discuss the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent decision in SEC v. Dorozhko, 
which greatly extended the reach of the SEC’s policing power by 
eliminating the fiduciary duty requirement if the case involves an 
affirmative misrepresentation rather than a nondisclosure.  Part IV will 
briefly address the lingering question of whether computer hacking is 
deceptive in the first place.  Part V will then argue that the Second 
Circuit impermissibly combined two distinct theories of securities fraud: 
nondisclosure fraud or “insider trading,” and affirmative 
misrepresentations or “fraud in connection with” a securities 
transaction.  To illustrate the point, this section will begin with a 
discussion of the two theories, followed by an analysis of why computer 
hacking does not fall into the broader category not addressed by the 
SEC or the Second Circuit, focusing on both elements of the action—
fraud and “in connection with” a securities transaction.  Part VI will 
 
17. See, e.g., ProfessorBainbridge.com, The Second Circuit’s Egregious Decision in SEC 
v. Dorozhko, (July 29, 2009) http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/ 
2009/07/the-second-circuits-recent-decision-in-sec-v-dorozhko-available-here-dealt-with-one-
of-the-questions-left-open-by-the.html; SEC v. Dorozhko: Second Circuit Dispenses With 
Fiduciary Duty Requirement in Hacker Insider Trading Case, SECURITIES DOCKET, July 23, 
2009, http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2009/07/23/sec-v-dorozhko-second-circuit-dispenses-
with-fiduciary-duty-requirement-in-hacker-insider-trading-case/ (citing online discussion with 
Peter Henning); Posting of Joel M. Cohen to The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate 
Governance and Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/29/ 
erosion-of-the-fiduciary-duty-requirement-in-insider-trading-actions/ (July 29, 2009, 9:22 
CST). 
18. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).  For a list of state computer fraud and 
unauthorized access laws visit NCSL.org, Computer Hacking and Unauthorized Access Laws, 
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/Computer 
HackingandUnauthorizedAccessLaws/tabid/13494/Default.aspx (last visited May 18, 2011). 
19. Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 589 (2008). 
20. 455 U.S. 222 (1980). 
21. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
22. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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argue that, notwithstanding the Second Circuit’s flawed approach, 
computer hacking carried out in connection with securities trades should 
be condemned by Rule 10b-5 as a matter of public policy.  Finally, Part 
VII will discuss alternative theories of insider trading that would 
proscribe trades made on nonpublic information obtained through 
computer hacking, arguing fidelity to Chief Justice Burger’s fraud on the 
investor theory. 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAW 
A.  Early Insider Trading Law 
At the turn of the twentieth century, state law governed securities 
transactions.23  Many states permitted insiders to trade on the basis of 
material, nonpublic information.24  By many, it was considered a perk for 
corporate investors.25  While insiders could not affirmatively 
misrepresent their company’s position, insiders owed no duty to disclose 
material information prior to trading on that information through the 
stock exchange.26  An insider had only a duty to disclose material 
information prior to face-to-face transactions between buyer and seller.27 
It was not until the 1929 Wall Street stock crash and subsequent 
depression that Congress passed the first federal securities laws28 
through the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 193429 
(“Securities Act”).  Congress intended for the Securities Act to reassure 
and protect investors while also reestablishing the integrity of the stock 
markets.30  The 1934 Securities Act addressed insider trading in two 
sections, Section 1631 and Section 10(b),32 the latter being more relevant 
 
23. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 3 (1999). 
24. Id. at 1–3. 
25. ELIZABETH SZOCKYJ, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL 
PLAYING FIELD 5 (1993). 
26. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933) (noting that “mere silence does 
not usually amount to a breach of duty” particularly in cases where trades occur over the 
stock exchange rather than face-to-face). 
27. See id. 
28. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 23. 
29. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (2006)). 
30. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 23. 
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 16, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006)).  Section 16 proscribes the use of nonpublic material information by 
corporate insiders for purposes of securities trading.  Id. 
32.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).  The full text reads:   
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to this Note. 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Act prohibits the use or employment 
of any “manipulative” or “deceptive device” in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security that contravenes SEC rules and 
regulations.33  The SEC intended Section 10(b) to act as a “catch-all” 
clause to prevent fraudulent practices within the securities markets.34  
On its face, Section 10(b) does not mention insider trading nor does it 
make any conduct unlawful.35  Rather, it grants the SEC authority to 
pass rules forbidding the use of “manipulative” or “deceptive devices” 
in connection with securities transactions.36  Pursuant to this rulemaking 
authority, the SEC later promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1948.37  Rule 10b-5 
prohibits the use of “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” and 
“any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”38  In effect, the laws 
forbid “(1) using any deceptive device (2) in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities, in contravention of [Rule 10b-5].”39 
For nearly twenty years, the SEC only used Rule 10b-5 to prosecute 
insiders who fraudulently misrepresented their company’s position for 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any 
securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [15 U.S.C.S. § 78c note]), any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.   
Id. 
33. Id.  Insider trading is but one form of deception covered under the statute.  There is 
also a private cause of action for simple fraud where an insider makes an affirmative 
misrepresentation affecting the market price of the company’s securities.  See, e.g., 
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 504, 506, 508 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a 
corporate manager who makes affirmative misrepresentations that, in effect, artificially 
support the market price of the company’s stock, may be liable under Section 10(b)); 
Liebhard v. Square D Co., 811 F. Supp. 354, 354–56 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Margolis v. Caterpillar, 
Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (C.D. Ill. 1991).   
34. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202–04, 206 (1976). 
35. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 16, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at § 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). 
36. See id. 
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
38. Id. 
39. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). 
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personal gain.40  The SEC first applied the rule to an outsider trading on 
inside information in the case In re Cady, Roberts & Co.41  In that case,  
Robert Gintel, a selling broker, purchased thousands of shares of 
Curtiss-Wright stock.42  Shortly thereafter, Curtiss-Wright decided to 
reduce its quarterly dividends.43  Gintel’s partner, J. Cheever Cowdin, 
who was also a member of Curtiss-Wright’s board of directors, informed 
Gintel of the company’s decision.44  Based on that information, Gintel 
sold several thousand shares of the company’s stock prior to Curtiss-
Wright’s public announcement, avoiding major losses for his clients.45 
The SEC found that Gintel violated Rule 10b-5 by trading on 
nonpublic, material information, holding that “insiders must disclose 
material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but 
which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if 
known, would affect their investment judgment.”46  If full disclosure 
would be “improper or unrealistic under the circumstances,” the party 
must abstain from trading.47  Thus, the “disclose or abstain” rule was 
born, requiring that insiders either disclose material information prior to 
trading in company stock or abstain from trading altogether.  The SEC 
then outlined two principles supporting a disclosure requirement.48  
First, the SEC reasoned that a relationship that affords one with direct 
or indirect access to material information intended only for corporate 
persons should not be used for personal gain.49  Second, the SEC 
reasoned that disclosure should be necessary where it would be 
inherently unfair for one with access to material information to take 
advantage of that information, to the detriment of those without such 
knowledge.50  How the party obtained the information was irrelevant.51 
Because In re Cady, Roberts & Co was an administrative decision, it 
did not hold much weight.  However, the Second Circuit Court of 
 
40. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 28. 
41. See generally In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).  
42. Id. at 908. 
43. Id. at 909. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 911. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 912. 
49. Id. 
50. Id.  
51. See id. at 910–911. 
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Appeals later adopted the rule in SEC v. Texas Gulf  Sulphur Co.52  In 
Texas Gulf Sulphur, corporate officers were charged under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 after trading in company securities prior to the 
public announcement of a large mineral strike.53  The court held that any 
person who traded on inside information would be liable under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, whether he accessed that information directly or 
indirectly, so long as he knew that the information was not available to 
those with whom he traded.54  The court then provided four elements a 
party must prove to establish liability under the statute: (i) a fraud or 
omission (ii) of material fact (iii) made in connection with the purchase 
or sale of securities (iv) with scienter55 or intent to deceive by way of 
omission.56  Today, these four elements are still required; however, later 
Supreme Court decisions would greatly narrow the scope of the Texas 
Gulf Sulpher holding.57 
B.  Classical Theory: Limiting Insider Trading  
Liability to Corporate Insiders 
In 1979, the Supreme Court greatly narrowed the reach of Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by limiting the “disclose or abstain” rule to 
situations where the buyer and seller had a relationship of trust and 
confidence.58  This is known as the “traditional” or “classical” theory of 
insider trading.59  In situations where an insider wishes to trade on 
information known to him solely by virtue of his position within the 
corporation, he must either publicly disclose the material information on 
which he wishes to trade or abstain from trading on that information 
altogether.60  Such insider trading is considered a “deceptive device” 
because corporate insiders owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders.61  
 
52. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
53. Id. at 847–50. 
54. Id. at 852. 
55. Scienter is defined as the “mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.”  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 n.12 (1976).   
56. See generally Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833. 
57. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 229–30 (1980).  See generally 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
58. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 228. 
59. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
60. See generally In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).  Corporate insiders 
include corporate officers, directors, controlling stockholders, company employees, attorneys, 
accountants, and any other consultants who become temporary fiduciaries of the corporation.  
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)). 
61. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
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When the insider trades on nonpublic information, he breaches this duty 
and deceives shareholders by taking unfair advantage of his inside 
knowledge—knowledge unavailable to the shareholder.62  In effect, 
under the classical theory, a fiduciary duty to the company’s 
shareholders is a required element of “deceptive device.”63 
The Supreme Court first narrowed the scope of Texas Gulf Sulpher 
in its Chiarella v. United States opinion.  Chiarella, an employee of 
Pandick Press, a financial printing company, was charged under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for trading on inside information regarding five 
impending corporate takeovers.64  He discovered this information by 
deciphering certain information contained in documents he handled 
while in the employment of Pandick Press.65  The lower court ruled that 
all those who possess inside information must disclose or abstain from 
trading on such information; the Supreme Court, however, rejected this 
theory upon review for failure to meet the “deceptive device” 
requirement.66  Because in cases of nondisclosure there “can be no fraud 
[i.e., deception] absent a duty to speak,” the Court held that Chiarella 
did not violate Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 because he owed no duty to 
disclose.67  The Court explained that mere possession of material 
nonpublic information does not create a duty to disclose under Section 
10(b).68  A fiduciary duty between the parties is required.  This fiduciary 
“duty ar[ises] from (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to 
inside information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take 
advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.”69  The 
Supreme Court reiterated this point four years later in its decision in 
Dirks v. SEC, stating that: 
 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on 
inside information “was not [the corporation’s] agent, . . . 
was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the 
 
62. Id. 
63. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 228. 
64. Id. at 224–25. 
65. Id. at 224. 
66. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, 445 U.S. 222, 237 
(1980). 
67. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 227 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)). 
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sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and 
confidence.”  Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, would “[depart] radically from the 
established doctrine that duty arises from a specific 
relationship between two parties” and would amount to 
“recognizing a general duty between all participants in 
market transactions to forgo actions based on material, 
nonpublic information.”70 
 
In Dirks, the Court extended insider trading liability to tippers and 
tippees.  Dirks, an officer at a New York broker-dealer firm, received 
notice from a former officer at Equity Funding of America that the 
company grossly overstated its assets by engaging in fraudulent 
practices.71  Dirks then confirmed these allegations through a personal 
investigation.72  Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded in the 
insurance company’s securities, but Dirks did disclose this information 
to a number of clients and investors who did in fact own Equity Funding 
securities.73  Upon receiving this information, many of these 
shareholders elected to sell their share of the company, avoiding huge 
losses incurred by uninformed shareholders as news of the fraud became 
public.74  Soon after, the SEC investigated Dirks’ role in uncovering the 
fraud and subsequently charged Dirks for insider trading in violation of 
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.75  Adhering to its decision in Chiarella, the 
Court held that one’s duty to disclose material nonpublic information 
prior to trading arises not from possessing the information, but rather 
from the relationship between the parties.76  Therefore, despite aiding 
and abetting investors by tipping them of the fraud allegations, Dirks 
was not liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because, as a broker, 
he owed no duty to Equity Funding or its shareholders.77  The import of 
this decision is that a tippee owes a fiduciary duty to company 
shareholders only when the insider shares nonpublic material 
information in breach of his fiduciary duty to company shareholders, 
and both the tipper and tippee are aware that such duty was breached.78  
 
70. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232–33). 
71. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–49. 
72. Id. at 649. 
73. Id.  
74. Id. at 649–50. 
75. Id.  
76. Id. at 657–658. 
77. Id. at 665. 
78. Id. at 660. 
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Here, Dirks, a stranger to Equity Funding, owed no such duty.79 
C.  Misappropriation Theory: Extending Insider Trading Liability to 
Outsiders Owing a Fiduciary Duty to Their Source 
Because the classical theory reached only persons who owed a 
fiduciary duty to company shareholders, the minority in Chiarella 
endorsed a more encompassing theory of liability, known as the 
misappropriation theory.80  The misappropriation theory of insider 
trading makes it illegal to trade securities based on misappropriated, 
nonpublic information.81  Two versions of the theory exist—the “fraud 
on the investor” theory and the “fraud on the source” theory.82 
1.  Fraud on the Investor Theory 
In his dissenting opinion in Chiarella, Chief Justice Burger proposed 
a broad reading of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which would extend 
liability to any person who misappropriated nonpublic information 
using any deceptive device.83  Recognizing that silence is generally 
permitted during business transactions unless the parties have a 
fiduciary relationship,84 Chief Justice Burger argued that liability should 
attach when a person obtains an informational advantage “not by 
superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful 
means.”85  Building on this principle, he advocated holding all persons to 
the same standard as insiders, requiring any person who 
misappropriated material nonpublic information to disclose or abstain 
from trading on it altogether.86 
  
 
79. Id. at 667. 
80. See Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 237–52 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring; 
Burger, C.J., dissenting; Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
81. Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading 
on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 114 (1984). 
82. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237–252. 
83. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
84. This general rule “permits a businessman to capitalize on his experience and skill in 
securing and evaluating relevant information [providing] incentive for hard work, careful 
analysis, and astute forecasting.”  Id. at 239. 
85. Id. at 239–240. 
86. Id. at 240.  
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2.  Fraud on the Source Theory 
“Fraud on the source” liability was a narrower version of the 
misappropriation theory espoused by Justice Stevens in his concurring 
opinion.87  He posited that when Chiarella bought securities in the open 
market, he violated a duty of silence owed to his employers and its 
customers, the source of material nonpublic information.88  The 
Supreme Court later adopted this theory in O’Hagan.89 
O’Hagan was partner at Dorsey & Whitney law firm.90  Grand Met 
engaged Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel to manage a potential 
tender offer for the Pillsbury Company’s common stock.91  O’Hagan 
himself was not involved in the tender offer; however, with knowledge 
of the offer, O’Hagan purchased approximately 2500 call options for 
Pillsbury stock and another 5000 shares of common stock.92  When 
Grand Met announced the tender offer, the share value increased 
significantly.  O’Hagan exercised his call options and sold his common 
stock realizing a profit of more than $4.3 million.93 
The Court found O’Hagan liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5, holding that “a person who trades in securities for personal profit, 
using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary 
duty to the source of the information, may be held liable for violating 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”94  O’Hagan’s failure to disclose his 
actions to Grand Met and Dorsey & Whitney was deceptive because he 
 
87. Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens suggested that Chiarella violated 
Section 10(b) under a narrow version of the misappropriation theory, but concurred in the 
result because Chiarella’s counsel did not make that argument at trial.  Id. at 238. 
88. Id. at 237. 
89. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997).  According to the 
misappropriation theory, a person violates Rule 10b-5 when he: “(1) misappropriates 
material[,] nonpublic information, (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust 
and confidence[,] and (3) uses that information in a securities transaction, (4) regardless of 
whether he owed any duty to the shareholders of the traded stock.”  SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 
439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990).  The SEC has successfully argued the misappropriation theory to 
impose liability on (1) traditional company insiders, including officers, directors, and senior 
management, O’Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1185, 
1187–88 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),  (2) rank-and-file employees who breached a fiduciary duty to their 
employers, SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410–12 (7th Cir. 1991), and (3) temporary insiders, 
SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 620–22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), and (4) possibly family members, 
United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205, 208–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  But c.f. United States v. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568–71 (2d Cir. 1991). 
90. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647. 
91. Id.  
92. Id. at 647–48. 
93. Id. at 648. 
94. Id. at 646. 
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had a duty to of nondisclosure to his employer.95  Essentially, the breach 
of duty to the source constitutes the requisite deception.96  Had O’Hagan 
disclosed to his employer his intent to trade, his duty would have been 
satisfied, and he would not have been subject to Rule 10(b)5. 
Moreover, the Court determined that the misappropriation theory 
satisfied the “in connection with” element of a Rule 10b-5 action.  The 
Court reasoned that his conduct was “in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a security” because O’Hagan completed the fraud when, 
without disclosure to his law firm, he used the information to purchase 
and then sell Pillsbury stock, not when he received the confidential 
information.97  Had O’Hagan used the nonpublic information for 
purposes unrelated to a securities transaction, he would not be subject 
to Rule 10b-5 because the rule does not capture all forms of fraud 
involving nonpublic information, but only those used to capitalize on 
such information.98 
III.  SEC V. DOROZHKO: ELIMINATING THE  
FIDUCIARY DUTY REQUIREMENT 
The O’Hagan decision was so significant because it expanded 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability to corporate outsiders who owe 
no fiduciary duty to the corporation or its shareholders.  The Court 
elected to base liability, instead, upon the fiduciary duty owed to the 
source of the material information.99  However, critics insisted that the 
Court adopted an overly restrictive version of misappropriation liability 
that frustrates the prosecution of defendants who trade on 
misappropriated information acquired through other means.100  The 
Second Circuit attempted to close this gap by holding that the breach of 
a fiduciary duty is not a required element of “deceptive device.”101 
 
95. Id. at 660. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 656. 
98. Id.  
99. See id. at 660. 
100. Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading 
Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1225–26 (1998).  To illustrate, 
because a computer hacker has no connection whatsoever—let alone a fiduciary 
relationship—with the source of confidential information, some scholars have concluded that 
computer hacking lacks the type of deception essential to the misappropriation theory, 
namely “feigned fidelity” to the source.  See id. at 1247, 1253, 1254, 1262, 1263.  Thus, the 
misappropriation theory would not extend to cases where the defendant trades on 
information gained illegally through computer hacking.  
101. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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A.  The Case: Dorozhko Hacks and Trades 
In early October 2007, IMS Health, Inc. announced that it would 
release its third-quarter financials after the securities markets closed at 
5:00 p.m. on October 17, 2007.102  Thomson Financial, Inc., an investor 
relations and web-hosting firm, managed IMS Health’s release.103 
On the afternoon of October 17, 2007, Dorozhko hacked into a 
secure server at Thomson Financial and downloaded IMS Health’s 
earnings report.104  Shortly before 3:00 p.m., Dorozhko purchased 
$41,670.90 worth of put options in IMS Health stock.105  This amounted 
to approximately ninety percent of all put options purchased in the 
previous six-week period.106  As announced, that evening IMS Health 
released its third-quarter earnings, which were twenty-eight percent 
lower than Wall Street expectations.107  When the market opened the 
next morning, the value of IMS Health’s stock declined approximately 
twenty-eight percent.108  The defendant sold his options within six 
minutes of the opening bell, realizing a profit of $286,456.59 overnight.109 
The SEC received notice of this irregular trading activity and 
successfully sought a temporary restraining order preventing the 
defendant from accessing the funds in his brokerage account.110  The 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York later 
denied the SEC’s request for a preliminary injunction for failure to show 
likelihood of success on the merits, reasoning that, as a matter of law, 
“computer hacking was not ‘deceptive’ within the meaning of Section 
10(b) as defined by the Supreme Court.”111  The court stated that “a 
breach of a fiduciary duty of disclosure is a required element of any 
‘deceptive’ device under section 10(b).”112  Owing no duty to either IMS 
Health shareholders or Thomson Financial, Dorozhko was not liable 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, despite violating a number of state 
and federal statutes criminalizing computer hacking.113  The SEC 
 







109. Id.  This amounted to approximately a 700% return on investment. 
110. Id. at 44–45. 
111. Id. at 45. 
112. Id. (citing SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
113. Id. 
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appealed. 
B.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Adopts a New 
“Affirmative Misrepresentation Theory of Insider Trading,”  
Eliminating the Fiduciary Duty Requirement 
On appeal, the SEC recognized that the facts did not fit under either 
the classical or “fraud on the source” misappropriation theory of insider 
trading because no fiduciary duty was breached.114  Rather, it urged the 
court to recognize the alleged hacking as an affirmative 
misrepresentation, which would not require breach of a fiduciary duty to 
be fraudulent.115  The court accepted the SEC’s argument, overturned 
the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further 
proceedings to determine whether computer hacking was “deceptive” or 
mere theft.116 
In holding that a breach of fiduciary duty was not required for 
computer hacking to be “deceptive” under Section 10(b), the court 
distinguished fraud by nondisclosure from fraud by affirmative 
misrepresentation.117  The court explained that previous Supreme Court 
decisions dealt only with cases of mere nondisclosure and that the 
common law theory of fraudulent nondisclosure requires breach of a 
fiduciary duty while the theory of fraudulent misrepresentation does 
not.118  Neither Chiarella, O’Hagan, or Dirks precluded premising 
Section 10(b) liability on common law fraud.  Chiarella’s “case 
concern[ed] the legal effect of [his] silence.”119  Likewise, O’Hagan’s case 
concerned his failure to disclose his intent to trade on material 
nonpublic information to the source, his employer.120  Finally, Dirks’ 
case concerned his failure to publicly disclose his knowledge of Equity 
Funding’s fraudulent practices prior to tipping his clients.121  In each 
case, the question of “deception” related to whether the defendant 
breached a fiduciary duty to disclose.  In Dorozhko on the other hand, 
 
114. Id.  
115. Id.  
116. Id. at 51.  The district court denied the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction 
holding that defendant’s hack and trade did not violate section 10(b) because defendant did 
not breach a fiduciary duty in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.  The alleged 
scheme was not manipulative because it did not control or artificially affect market activity.  
Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 329. 
117. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49–50. 
118. Id.  
119. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980). 
120. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647–48 (1997). 
121. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 649–50 (1983). 
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the question of “deception” related not to a breach of a fiduciary duty, 
but to an affirmative misrepresentation, which is deceptive in and of 
itself.  Therefore, in cases involving misrepresentation, a fiduciary duty 
is not a required element of “deceptive device.”122  Because the court 
was aware of no Supreme Court case contravening this holding, it added 
that “[a]bsent  a controlling precedent that ‘deceptive’ has a more 
limited meaning, we see no reason to complicate the enforcement of 
Section 10(b) by divining new requirements.”123  Essentially, the Second 
Circuit viewed its holding as simply paralleling the contours of common 
law fraud. 
In addition, the court left open the question of whether computer 
hacking is deceptive in the first place.  Despite asserting that 
“misrepresenting one’s identity in order to gain access to information 
that is otherwise off limits, and then stealing that information is plainly 
‘deceptive’ within the ordinary meaning of the word,”124 the court 
hesitated to apply this general principle to the set of facts before it.  
Instead, it remanded the case to the district court to determine whether 
the computer hacking in this particular case involved an affirmative 
misrepresentation, deceptive within the ordinary meaning of Section 
10(b).  Upon remand, the court granted the SEC summary judgment 
after the motion went unopposed.125 
IV. COMPUTER HACKING—“DECEPTIVE THEFT” OR “MERE THEFT?” 
Because Dorozhko’s case was dismissed upon an unopposed motion 
for summary judgment, the question still remains as to whether 
computer hacking is indeed “deceptive.”126  Prior to the Second Circuit’s 
 
122. See id. at 649–51.  But see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston 
(USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 389 & n.30 (5th Cir. 2007) (interpreting Chiarella and O’Hagan as 
“establish[ing] that a device, such as a scheme, is not ‘deceptive’ unless it involves breach of 
some duty of candid disclosure.”). 
123. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49. 
124. Id. at 51. 
125. Dorozhko, Litig. Release No. 21465, 2010 WL 1213430 (Mar. 29, 2010). 
126. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51.  Factual findings regarding the nature of Dorozhko’s 
hacking were required because the record did not contain such information.  First, Dorozhko 
elected to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to refrain from testifying.  Second, Dorozhko 
“concealed his exit from the computer system,” and third, Thomson Financial chose not to 
fully explore the details of Dorozhko’s method of hacking so that it could protect certain 
trade secrets.  Brief of Appellant at 24–25, SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 
08-0201-CV).  Upon remand, the SEC, in its motion for summary judgment, admitted that is 
still had not determined how Dorozhko gained access to Thomson’s computers.  
Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff at 14, SEC 
v. Dorozhko, No. 07-CIV-9606 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  Further, beyond quoting the Second 
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Dorozhko opinion, legal scholars generally thought that theft of inside 
information, while punishable under criminal codes,127 would not give 
rise to insider trading liability.128  The reasoning behind this assumption 
was that liability based on an affirmative misrepresentation is actionable 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only if the court finds a false 
representation, in other words, a “lie.”129  So, for example, if a person 
forcefully broke into an office and stole material nonpublic information 
for the purpose of securities trading, the thief would be subject to 
criminal theft or burglary charges but free from insider trading liability 
because there was no lie.130  The requisite fraud or deception would be 
missing.131 
In its brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, the SEC argued that 
hackers gain access to nonpublic information stored on computer in two 
ways, both of which constitute affirmative misrepresentations.132  First, 
hackers may falsely identify themselves by masquerading as other 
authorized users.133  Second, a hacker might “exploit a weakness in an 
[electronic code] within a program” to grant him access to otherwise 
unavailable content.134  In the court’s view, “misrepresenting one’s 
identity in order to gain access to information that is otherwise off 
limits, and then stealing that information is plainly ‘deceptive.’”135 For 
example, if a computer hacker accesses nonpublic information by using 
a password he is not authorized to use, he deceives the computer by 
impersonating the rightful user.  This impersonation constitutes 
deception.136  With companies increasingly turning to computers to 
perform tasks once completed by human beings, such as granting and 
 
Circuit opinion, the SEC’s brief in support of its summary judgment motion offered little 
argument as to why computer hacking should be deemed deceptive.  It simply offered that 
Dorozhko accessed IMS Health’s earnings “by infiltrating, tricking, and misleading Thomson 
Financial’s highly complex and secure computer security systems.”  Id. at 12. 
127. See sources cited supra note 18. 
128. See sources cited supra note 4. 
129. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Ruling on Hackers as Inside Traders: Right in Theory, 
Wrong on the Law, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 9, 2009, at 1, available at 
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/100909Bainbridge_LB.pdf. 
130. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
131. Id.  
132. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2009). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 51.   
136. Randall W. Quinn, Comment: The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in 
the Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865, 894–95 (2003). 
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denying access to confidential information once stored offline, there 
should be no distinction between deceiving a person or a computer. 
The Second Circuit struggled with whether accessing unauthorized 
information stored on a computer by “exploiting code” was deception or 
mere theft.  On one hand, this conduct parallels the thief who exploits 
the weakness in a building’s security system in order to break in and 
physically steal information.137  This conduct would not be deceptive 
because the theft was carried out by using force, not deceit.138  On the 
other hand, code exploitation techniques may be characterized as 
allowing hackers “to take control of the target program’s execution flow 
by tricking it into running a piece of malicious code that has been 
smuggled into memory.”139  Computer hackers may trick a computer into 
completing actions the hacker wants it to do even when the code, as 
written, was designed to prevent those actions.140  Trickery is a form of 
deception; so, if this characterization were accepted, code exploitation 
would also be deceptive under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.141 
V.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT EFFECTIVELY COMBINED TWO DISTINCT 
THEORIES OF SECURITIES FRAUD INTO ONE 
Although computer hacking may be characterized as deceptive or 
fraudulent conduct, the link between such fraud and the securities 
transaction is misplaced.  The Second Circuit’s unprecedented holding—
that a fiduciary duty is not an element of an insider trading case where 
an affirmative misrepresentation is involved—effectively combines two 
distinct theories of securities fraud by substituting an insider trading 
case’s fiduciary duty analysis with a common law affirmative 
misrepresentation analysis. 
By definition, insider trading cases involve nondisclosure fraud.  In a 
typical scenario, a corporate insider purchases or sells stock after failing 
to disclose his superior knowledge to the public.  Liability under Section 
10(b) attaches because the insider breached his duty to disclose.  This 
section will begin by distinguishing the two theories of fraud, then 
explain why the case cannot be proved under a traditional affirmative 
 
137. See id. at 895. 
138. See id. 
139. JON ERICKSON, HACKING: THE ART OF EXPLOITATION 118 (2d ed. 2008) 
(emphasis added). 
140. Id. at 87. 
141. For a summary of various computer hacking techniques and an argument as to why 
each is deceptive under 10(b) see Michael D. Wheatley, Apologia for the Second Circuit’s 
Opinion in SEC v. Dorozhko, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 47–50 (2010). 
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misrepresentation theory. 
A.  Distinguishing Nondisclosure Fraud from  
Affirmative Misrepresentation Fraud 
To establish a case under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, there must 
be (1) a deceptive device (i.e., fraud) (2) in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities, in contravention of Rule 10b-5.142  
Plaintiffs may bring claims under this general prohibition by arguing two 
theories of fraud: nondisclosure or affirmative misrepresentation.  
Nondisclosure cases are those cases traditionally referred to as “insider 
trading,” while affirmative misrepresentation cases fall into a more 
general category of securities fraud which prohibits all fraud in 
connection with securities trades. 
Insider trading involves the nondisclosure of material nonpublic 
information, gained not by skill or effort, but rather through the 
investor’s relationship to the issuing company, its shareholders, or the 
source of his nonpublic information.143  The “deceptive device” is the 
trader’s breach of that fiduciary relationship.144  The fiduciary duty 
requirement reflects the principles that mere possession of nonpublic 
information does not trigger a duty of disclosure145 and that the federal 
securities laws target “the inappropriate and deceptive use of special 
relationships.”146  Where an investor receives nonpublic information 
through permissible channels and without an obligation to keep the 
information confidential or where the investor discloses the information 
to his fiduciary prior to trading, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not 
forbid trades based on such information.147  Again, computer hackers do 
not fit under this category of cases because the hacker owes no fiduciary 
duty. 
Affirmative misrepresentation cases, on the other hand, generally 
involve a material misrepresentation made to the investing public for 
the purpose of inducing the sale or purchase of stock.148  The 
 
142. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). 
143. Id. at 658–59. 
144. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). 
145. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 651–54 (1983) (discussing Chiarella v. United States, 
455 U.S. 222 (1980)). 
146. Cohen, supra note 17. 
147. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662–63. 
148. See, e.g., Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 506 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding 
that where a defendant’s 10b-5 action is based on an affirmative misrepresentation which 
distorts the value of stock, the defendant need not have owe a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff to 
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misrepresentation involved is made by the defendant to induce someone 
else to enter into a securities transaction, not to inform his own 
securities transaction.  These cases do not fall under the title of “insider 
trading,” but rather under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s general 
prohibition against fraud in connection with securities transactions.  The 
“deceptive device” here is the material misrepresentation of fact.  
Finding a computer hacker liable under this theory is equally 
unprecedented as affirmative misrepresentation cases have never dealt 
with false statements made to computers. 
B.  Why an Affirmative Misrepresentation Made to A Computer is Not 
Punishable Under 10(b)’s General Prohibition Against Fraud 
Connection with a Securities Transaction 
Likely recognizing that computer hacking would not fall under the 
general prohibition against fraud in connection with a securities 
transaction, the SEC argued for a new theory of insider trading, 
accepted by the Second Circuit, that substitutes the longstanding 
fiduciary duty requirement with a test for common law fraud.  This 
section discusses why the SEC did not pursue a traditional affirmative 
misrepresentation cause of action.  First, the SEC would have faced a 
significant hurdle in establishing fraud, namely the elements of 
materiality and reliance.  Second, certain timing issues related to the 
consummation of the fraud arise with regard to the “in connection with” 
requirement. 
1.  Problems with Establishing Fraud 
Although computer hacking may be characterized as fraudulent 
conduct, the link between such fraud and the securities transaction is 
misplaced.  Under the common law, liability for mere nondisclosure 
requires a fiduciary duty to disclose.149  This duty to disclose “arises 
when one party has information ‘that the other [party] is entitled to 
know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
confidence between them.’”150  However, liability for fraudulent 
misrepresentation does not.151  To establish a prima facie case, the 
plaintiff must show that the defendant (i) made a false representation 
 
be held liable). 
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(1) (1976). 
150. Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)). 
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525. 
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(ii) concerning a material fact (iii) “for the purpose of inducing [him] to 
act or to refrain from action,” (iv) that he actually and justifiably relied 
upon the representation and (v) that his injury was caused by such 
reliance.152  A computer hacker thus makes a false representation of 
material fact by falsely identifying himself to a computer system as an 
authorized user.  The computer then relies on this misrepresentation 
when it grants access to the hacker.  This false identification is made to 
induce the computer system into allowing him access he would 
otherwise not be granted.  Breach of the computer system’s security 
measures would result in injury when confidential information is stolen. 
Even if computer hacking is deemed fraudulent, the definition  of 
fraud under securities law does not mirror its definition under the 
common law.  In fact, the Court has explicitly stated that “Section 10(b) 
does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law.”153 Take for 
example the elements of materiality and reliance.  Under 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, the fact must be material to the investor.  Likewise, the 
investor must rely on the misrepresented material fact.  It is not 
sufficient for there to be any material fact or reliance by anyone 
somewhere in the factual situation presented.  Consequently, computer 
hacking does not fit neatly into a traditional affirmative 
misrepresentation case.  The following discussion of the materiality and 
reliance requirements will further illuminate the point. 
A statement is material if it is substantially likely that a reasonable 
investor would consider the information relevant to his decision to 
purchase or sell securities and if it “alter[s] the ‘total mix’ of information 
 
152. Id. 
153. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008) 
(citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002)); see also Cohen, supra note 17.  In his blog 
posting, Cohen argues that the Second Circuit’s decision: 
 
[P]ermits the SEC to simply characterize alleged illegal trading as an 
“affirmative misrepresentation” whenever it cannot adequately establish 
the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Historically, the fiduciary-
relationship element has required the SEC to meet exacting pleading 
standards; now, regulators have license to charge many acts of garden-
variety fraud or financial unfairness under the nebulous rubric of 
“affirmative misrepresentation.” Conceivably, that could embrace any 
fraud involving the purchase or sale of securities, not merely the 
prototypical Section 10(b) charge where insiders exploit inside 
information for personal advantage as a normal emolument of corporate 
office. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
14. ODIAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  9:28 PM 
2011] MISREPRESENTATION THEORY OF INSIDER TRADING 1335 
made available.”154  While a false statement to a computer may be 
deemed material in that the user would be denied access if they used 
their true identity, it does not meet the 10b-5 standard because the false 
statement does not affect investor decision making.  The fact that the 
information Dorozhko stole met this definition of material is irrelevant.  
To meet the materiality requirement in the computer hacking context, 
the Court would need to broaden the definition of materiality to 
encompass any material misrepresentation made in connection with a 
securities transaction.  Currently, the law appears to extend only to 
material misrepresentations made to the investing public. 
Again, the same issue arises with the element of reliance.  Reliance 
is a required element of a Section 10(b) action because it establishes the 
causal connection between the misrepresentation and the economic 
injury; in other words, but for the misrepresentation, the investor would 
have refrained from entering a securities transaction.155  The 
misrepresentation need not be the sole cause, but a substantial or 
significant one.156  In the securities context, a court determines whether 
the investor relied on an affirmative misrepresentation by weighing 
several factors: 
 
(1) The sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in 
financial and securities matters; (2) the existence of long 
standing business or personal relationships; (3) access to 
relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship; (5) concealment of the fraud; (6) the 
opportunity to detect fraud; (7) whether the plaintiff 
initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the 
transaction; and (8) the specificity or generality of the 
misrepresentations.157 
 
Recognizing that direct proof of reliance is oftentimes an irrelevant 
and unreasonable evidentiary burden,158 the Court adopted the fraud on 
 
154. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).  In other words, if the nonpublic information would 
affect the company’s stock price, the information would be material.   
155. Id. at 243.  In the section 10(b) context, reliance is coterminous with causation in 
fact.  Wilson v. Comtech Telecomm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1981). 
156. Wilson, 648 F.2d at 92. 
157. Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Zobrist v. 
Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516–17 (10th Cir. 1983)). 
158. In Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit 
eliminated the direct reliance requirement.  It explained:  
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the market theory of reliance.159  This theory assumes that stock prices 
are determined by an investor’s evaluation of publicly available material 
information; therefore, any material misrepresentation will alter the 
stock price, effectively defrauding investors who rely on price as an 
indication of the stock’s value.160  A computer relying on a false 
identification does not fall within 10b-5’s understanding of reliance 
because the hacker’s misrepresentation is made to a computer, not an 
investor.  In the securities law context, it is reliance on the part of the 
investor that matters.  In the computer hacker context, at most, the 
investor relies on any distortion in price caused by the hacker’s 
subsequent trade.  It is a stretch to say that but for the computer hack, 
the investor would not have engaged in a securities transaction.  The 
link between the affirmative misrepresentation and reliance by the 
investor is a step removed.  For Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to apply 
courts would need to fashion a theory of reliance that bridged the gap 




A purchaser on the stock exchanges may be either unaware of a specific 
false representation, or may not directly rely on it; he may purchase 
because of a favorable price trend, price earnings ratio, or some other 
factor.  Nevertheless, he relies generally on the supposition that the 
market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has 
artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the 
representations underlying the stock price—whether he is aware of it or 
not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations.  Requiring 
direct proof from each purchaser that he relied on a particular 
representation when purchasing would defeat recovery by those whose 
reliance was indirect, despite the fact that the causational chain is broken 
only if the purchaser would have purchased the stock even had he known 
of the misrepresentation. 
Id. at 907. 
159. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241–43. 
160. Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986).  In Peil, the court stated: 
 
The causal connection between the defendants’  fraud and the plaintiffs’ 
purchase of stock in such a case is  no less significant than in a case of 
direct reliance on misrepresentations. In both cases, defendants’ 
fraudulent statements or omissions cause plaintiffs to purchase stock they 
would not have purchased absent defendants’ misstatements and/or 
omissions. 
Id. 
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2.  Problems With Timing and the “in Connection With” Requirement 
Though easier to overcome, issues of timing arise with regard to the 
statute’s second element: the “in connection with” requirement.  
Whether computer hacking for purposes of obtaining nonpublic 
information is sufficiently “in connection with” the purchase or sale of 
securities to fall under Section 10(b) depends largely on how a court 
characterizes the fraudulent act.  The SEC interprets the phrase broadly, 
but not “so broadly as to convert every common law fraud that happens 
to involves securities into a violation of 10(b).  Section 10(b) requires 
“deception ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,’ not 
deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller.”161  The general rule is 
that the “scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coincide[;]” 
however its application is far from clear.162 
In O’Hagan, the court construed the “in connection with” 
requirement within the context of its newly adopted misappropriation 
theory.  Recognizing that nonpublic information is property to which a 
company is entitled exclusive use, the Court reasoned that “fraud is 
consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential 
information, but [rather] when . . . the information [is used] to purchase 
or sell securities.”163  This hurdle is necessary because, in a 
misappropriation on the source case, receipt of nonpublic information is 
not fraudulent; rather it is the investor’s later breach of his fiduciary 
duty to his source.  Therefore, “[t]he securities transaction and the 
breach of duty . . . coincide.”164  The securities transaction and the breach 
of duty would not coincide, however, if the property obtained through 
fraudulent means had independent value—that is, the property could be 
used for any number of transaction unrelated to the securities market.165  
 
161. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997). 
162. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2002).   
163. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656. 
164. Id. at 656. 
165. The government conceded that embezzling funds to finance a security trade, while 
fraudulent, is not “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities, because the 
misappropriated funds have independent value—that is, the funds could be used for any 
number of transactions unrelated to the securities market.  Therefore, a subsequent securities 
trade would be sufficiently detached from the “in connection with” requirement.  
Misappropriation of nonpublic information, on the other hand, derives its value solely from 
its utility in securities trading.  Id.  This discussion appeared as dicta, so it was initially unclear 
whether the Court intended to introduce a requirement that the property obtained have no 
independent value.  However, five years later, the Court in SEC v. Zandford stated that it did 
not “read O’Hagan as so limited.”  Zandford, 535 U.S. at 824.  This reading makes sense 
because it is counterintuitive to draw lines based on possible alternative uses of property 
when it is clear from the facts that the investor obtained the information with but one 
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This distinction is of little concern here because the Court accepted that 
misappropriated nonpublic information had no value apart from its 
utility in securities trading. 
Affirmative misrepresentation cases, however, are different.  Here, 
the fraudulent act is the misrepresentation itself—no subsequent 
conduct is necessary to consummate the fraud.166  On the other hand, in 
Dorozhko’s case, the hack and subsequent securities transaction took 
place only thirty minutes apart, arguably as part of one single scheme to 
defraud.167  If characterized as a single scheme, the fraud would not be 
complete until the securities transaction was complete; if Dorozhko 
chose not to engage in a securities transaction, his hack would not 
trigger Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Borrowing the Court’s language 
in O’Hagan, Dorozhko’s “fraud [was] consummated not when [he] 
gain[ed] the confidential information, but when . . . he use[d] the 
information to purchase [and] sell securities.  [Dorozhko’s] securities 
transaction and the breach of [the computer’s secure network] thus 
coincide.”168  The intent underlying the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
prohibition supports the single scheme viewpoint because the ultimate 
securities transaction affects the integrity of the market the same way 
insider trading would.169 
A single scheme approach is also supported by the Court’s decision 
in United States v. Zandford, which couched the “in connection with” 
requirement in terms of independent events.170  In Zandford, a securities 
broker persuaded a client to grant him a power of attorney allowing him 
to engage in securities transactions without prior approval.171  Using this 
power, the broker then sold his client’s securities and embezzled the 
proceeds.172  The Court deemed this “scheme” deceptive because “each 
[sale] was neither authorized by, nor disclosed to, the [client]. . . . Each 
time [Zandford] exercised his power of disposition for his own benefit, 
that conduct, without more, was a fraud.”173  The Court determined that 
Zandford’s fraud and sales were not independent events; rather the 
 
intent—to use that information as a basis for his securities transaction.   
166. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656. 
167. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) rev’d, SEC v. 
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2009). 
168. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656. 
169. See id. at 685–869 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
170. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820–21. 
171. Id. at 815. 
172. Id. at 821. 
173. Id. at 820–821 (internal citations omitted). 
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fraud coincided with the sales themselves.174  Arguably, Dorozkho’s 
fraud coincided with his later purchase and sale of securities because the 
hack and subsequent transaction were not independent events.  That 
Dorozhko’s hack and subsequent trade occurred only thirty minutes 
apart indicates that hack was designed to acquire nonpublic information 
that would inform his securities transactions. 
With two logical and competing arguments construing the “in 
connection requirement,” it is hardly clear how the Court would decide 
the issue.  Although there is a strong argument that Dorozhko’s hack 
and trade was one deceptive scheme, it is equally plausible that the 
Court would deem the fraud consummated by the misrepresentation 
itself. 
VI.  HISTORY AND GOOD PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS CONDEMNATION 
OF COMPUTER HACKING IN CONNECTION WITH SECURITIES 
TRANSACTIONS UNDER SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5. 
Focusing insider trading liability on a fiduciary duty has created a 
gap in enforcement that makes trades based on lawfully obtained 
nonpublic information illegal and trades based on unlawfully obtained 
nonpublic information legal.175  This anomalous result makes little sense.  
Therefore, although the Second Circuit’s newly derived theory of insider 
trading liability does not comport with current securities law,176 history 
and good policy favors a finding that computer hacking is in fact 
deceptive under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Such policy 
considerations include (1) the original intent of the securities laws, (2) 
economic efficiency, (3) moral considerations of fairness, (4) implied 
congressional consent, and most importantly (5) more appropriate 
punishment and remedies. 
A.  Original Intent of the Securities Laws 
First, in promulgating Section 10(b) and Rule 10-b5, Congress did 
not intend to delineate specific acts or practices that constitute fraud.  
Rather, the laws were “designed to encompass the infinite variety of 
devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and 
others.”177  Thus, “[c]onduct by a defendant that had the principal 
purpose and effect of creating a false appearance in deceptive 
 
174. Id. at 820. 
175. Wheatley, supra note 141, at 51. 
176. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 129, at 1. 
177. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). 
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transactions as part of a scheme to defraud is conduct that uses or 
employs a deceptive device within the meaning of Section 10(b).”178  
Nowhere does Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 premise “deception” on the 
existence of a fiduciary duty.179  Furthermore, Section 10(b) was 
intended to prohibit invention of any other “cunning devices,”180 
suggesting that the courts should tailor the laws to capture innovations 
not contemplated when the Securities Act was passed.  This would 
include trading made possible by computer hacking. 
Moreover, in 1987, the Senate proposed a bill, the Insider Trading 
Proscriptions Act (ITP Act) for consideration by Congress.181  The Act 
proposed a statutory definition of insider trading which would have 
prohibited: 
 
[T]rading while in possession of material, nonpublic 
information . . . if such information has been obtained by, 
or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, (A) 
theft, bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through 
electronic or other means) or (B) conversion, 
misappropriation, or a breach of any fiduciary duty, any 
personal or other relationship of trust and confidence, or 
any contractual or employment relationship.182 
 
Under this language, computer hacking would be illegal insider 
trading as theft or espionage through electronic means.  Although 
Congress ultimately elected not to pass the ITP Act, it was not because 
the senate objected to the types of conduct included in the definition.183  
Rather, Congress chose to leave the task of identifying insider trading to 
the judiciary, reasoning that “the court-drawn parameters of insider 
trading have established clear guidelines for the vast majority of 
traditional insider trading cases, and . . . a statutory definition could 
potentially be narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate 
schemes to evade the law.”184  Notwithstanding the abandonment of the 
 
178. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). 
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
180. Stock Exchange Regulatory Hearing on H.R. 7852 & 8720 Before the H. Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas Corcoran, 
Counsel with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation). 
181. Insider Trading Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, 11–13 (1988). 
182. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1368 (2009). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. (citation omitted). 
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ITP Act, it is clear that Congress believes that insider trading law should 
reach trades based on nonpublic information acquired through 
computer hacking. 
B.  Economic Efficiency 
One goal of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, oft repeated, is the need 
to protect the integrity of the securities markets from abuses by those 
with access to material nonpublic information that would affect the price 
of the corporation’s securities upon public disclosure.185  The “integrity 
of the market” rationale for banning insider trading thus relies on the 
notion that proper stock valuation can be made only when factors 
motivating an investor’s trade are available to the public.186  If such 
factors were unavailable to the outsider, he would theoretically buy or 
sell at the wrong price, resulting in a net loss.187  It follows that 
eliminating insider trading would increase investor confidence that they 
are not trading at an informational disadvantage.  Because the securities 
market is the backbone of the American commercial system, integrity of 
the market is essential;188 and conduct that threatens market integrity, 
such as computer hacking, should therefore violate Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5. 
 
185. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (stating that the purpose of the 
Securities Act was “to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor 
confidence”); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968) (“It was the 
intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical 
market risks, [which include] the risk that one’s evaluative capacity . . . may exceed another’s 
capacity.”). 
186. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245, 247 (1988). 
187. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 149–150.  Professor Bainbridge argues that this 
reasoning is flawed because it assumes that outsiders trade only with insiders making trades 
based on nonpublic information.  Given the impersonal nature of the securities exchange, 
gains will be shared by insiders with knowledge of material nonpublic information and 
outsiders with no such knowledge.  Id. at 150–51.   
188. Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread Is the Problem and Is There Adequate 
Criminal Enforcement?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1–2 
(2006) (statement of Arlen Specter, Senator, State of Pennsylvania).  However, some argue 
that deregulating insider trading would benefit both society and the firm.  See generally 
HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).  First, insider 
trading would allow for a more efficient market because the market price of a company’s 
securities would be set at the level it would receive if the nonpublic information were publicly 
available.  For example, if a share is selling at $30, but knowledge of material nonpublic 
information would cause the price to rise to $40, insider trading would cause the price to 
reach $40 earlier—in other words, before the information is made public.  Id. at 77–91.  
Second, insider trading would serve as an efficient way of compensating and incentivizing 
entrepreneurs to innovate.  Id. at 131–41.  This second argument, however, seems to ignore 
the fact that insiders often trade on negative nonpublic information to avoid losses. 
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C.  Moral Rationale 
Allowing theft of nonpublic information committed for the sole 
purpose of trading on that information flies in the face of morality.  
Justice Blackmun, in his Chiarella minority opinion, noted that the most 
“dramatic evidence” of Chiarella’s fraud was the fact that he stole 
information for personal benefit knowing that it was wrong and 
forbidden by his employer.189  After all, “[t]he more unfair the activity, 
the more justification there is for regulation.”190  Securities trading 
should be free from investors having any undue advantages.191  Thus, 
material nonpublic information should not be used for the personal 
benefit of anyone because such use would be inherently unfair to 
outside investors.192  This is particularly true when the information is 
accessed through unlawful means such as computer fraud.  Despite 
being a non-fiduciary, arguably, the computer hacker’s conduct is more 
reprehensible because the he takes affirmative action to not only use 
undue advantage in securities trading, but to also break state and federal 
computer fraud laws. 
D.  Implied Congressional Consent 
Congress has opted not to pass legislation limiting the reach of 
insider trading laws to transactions made in breach of a fiduciary duty.  
While the question of whether a computer hacker, who owes no 
fiduciary duty to either the shareholders of a corporation or the source 
of confidential information, may be liable for insider trading under Rule 
10b-5 was one of first impression for the Second Circuit, it was not the 
first instance where the SEC prosecuted a computer hacker.193  In 2005 
and 2007, the SEC successfully sought a temporary restraining order to 
freeze the defendants’ assets and an order to repatriate funds taken 
outside of the United States.194  Both cases were factually similar to 
 
189. Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 245–46 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
190. Prentice, supra note 11, at 305. 
191. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
192. Id. at 241 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)). 
193. In Blue Bottle Limited., Litig. Release No. 20018, 90 SEC Docket 268 (Feb. 26, 
2007), the defendants were charged with illegally accessing, through a computer system, 
information about imminent new releases.  Using that information, the defendants traded in 
the securities of twelve corporations prior to public dissemination, realizing $2,707,177 in 
profits.  In Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, Litig. Release No. 19450, 86 SEC Docket 1591 
(Nov. 1, 2005), the defendants were charged “with conducting a fraudulent scheme involving 
the electronic theft and trading in advance of more than 360 confidential press releases issued 
by more than 200 U.S. public companies,” realizing at least $7.8 million in illegal profits. 
194. Blue Bottle Ltd., 90 SEC Docket at 268; Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, 86 SEC 
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Dorozhko.195  Although each judge granted the SEC’s requested relief, 
neither issued a published opinion.196  Congress has implied its approval 
of such decisions by continuing to take no action in defining insider 
trading under federal law. 
E.  Criminal Computer Fraud Penalties Are Insufficient 
Criminal penalties for computer fraud are insufficient where the 
misappropriated information is used to trade in securities.  First, under 
the federal computer fraud statute, a hacker would be subject only to a 
fine and a term of imprisonment.197  Computer fraud statutes do not 
provide means for freezing assets or repatriating profits made by foreign 
defendants.198  In contrast, under the Securities Act, the SEC is able to 
seek injunctive relief to prevent future unlawful trading, asset freezes, 
disgorgement of illegally obtained proceeds, and civil penalties of up to 
three times the illegal profits made or the losses avoided.199  It may also 
seek criminal penalties, including imprisonment, where the selling or 
buying of securities was willful and fraudulent.200  As SEC Enforcement 
Deputy Director Peter Bresnan points out, “In today’s global economy, 
where con artists can misuse computer technology to defraud innocent 
U.S. investors from far beyond our borders, freezing the unlawful profits 
of those behind these intrusion schemes is especially important.”201  
Second, despite the availability of a private cause of action against 
hackers, companies are reluctant to pursue such cases for fear of the 
negative publicity that accompanies public disclosure of such security 
 
Docket at 1591. 
195. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
196. Id. 
197. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)–(c) (2006).   
198. See id. § 1030. 
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1), 78u-1, 78u-2.  Prior to 1984, inside traders were only subject 
to disgorgement and possibly criminal sanctions.  Civil penalties could not be imposed until 
the defendant was convicted criminally.  NASSER ARSHADI & THOMAS H. EYSSELL, THE 
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE INSIDER TRADING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 49 (1993).  
This punishment provided little deterrent value.  So, in 1984, Congress passed the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78), which 
increased criminal fines and prison times and allowed the SEC to impose treble damages.   
200. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c), 78u-2.  Finally, the SEC is authorized to make “bounty” 
payments to any person who provides information leading to civil penalties.  The bounty 
awarded may be up to 10% of the civil penalty collected.  Id. §§ 78u-1. 
201. Press Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Order Freezing $3 Million in Proceeds of 
Suspected Foreign-Based Account Intrusion Scheme (Mar., 7, 2007) (on file with author), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-33.htm. 
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breaches.202  This is particularly true where the security breach does not 
result in significant financial losses.203 
Increased penalties serve as a better deterrent and more appropriate 
punishment.204  To illustrate, the SEC oftentimes charges a defendant 
with securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 even where it has already 
obtained a computer hacking or wire fraud conviction.  In SEC v. 
Zandford, the defendant was indicted and later convicted of thirteen 
counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.205  His punishment 
consisted of fifty-two months in prison and payment of $10,800 in 
restitution.206  After the indictment, the SEC filed a civil suit alleging 
that Zandford also violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by engaging in 
a scheme to defraud.  Zandford was found guilty, and as a result, was 
enjoined from engaging in future violations of the securities laws and 
ordered to disgorge the $343,000 he realized in ill-gotten gains.207  Had 
Section 10(b) been unavailable, Zandford would have retained the fruit 
of his crime. 
VII.  ARGUING FIDELITY TO CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER’S FRAUD ON THE 
INVESTOR THEORY OF INSIDER TRADING 
Because the newly created affirmative misrepresentation theory 
cannot be sustained and computer hacking does not fit within the 
contours of classical insider trading or the fraud on the source theory 
adopted by the Supreme Court in O’Hagan, the Court or Congress must 
adopt a new version of the misappropriation theory or an entirely new 
theory of insider trading to capture this type of deceptive theft.  Legal 
scholars have advocated several approaches including the parity of 
information theory, property rights theory, deceptive acquisition theory, 
and the fraud on investors theory.  This section will discuss each briefly, 
and then propose the fraud on investors theory as the superior solution. 
  
 
202. Wheatley, supra note 141, at 55–56. 
203. Id. 
204. Admittedly, Congress could achieve the same result by revising the computer fraud 
statute to add disgorgement, asset freezes, and injunctive relief as available remedies. 
205. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 815–16 (2002).   
206. Id. at 816. 
207. Id. 
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A.  Parity of Information Theory 
The parity of information theory would prohibit trading on all 
nonpublic material regardless of the manner in which the investor 
gained access to such information.  However, this theory has been 
repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court on the grounds that it would 
inhibit legitimate activities conducted by market analysts such as 
questioning corporate officers and “ferret[ing] out and analyz[ing] 
information.”208  Such inhibition would negatively affect market 
efficiency in stock pricing, to the detriment of all investors.  Because this 
theory has been foreclosed by the Court, adoption would require 
congressional action. 
B.  Property Rights Theory 
The property rights theory finds its basis in In re Cady, Roberts & 
Co., which based liability on the misuse of “information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit 
of anyone.”209  Recognizing that nonpublic information is “property” to 
which companies have exclusive use, a property rights approach would 
make illegal trades made by an investor who uses, for his personal 
benefit, material nonpublic information intended by the company to be 
used only for a corporate purpose.210  By eliminating the fiduciary duty 
requirement, this rule would capture illegal conduct such as computer 
hacking because the information obtained through hacking would be 
used for the hacker’s personal benefit rather than for a corporate 
purpose.211  Moreover, this theory would eliminate a misappropriator’s 
ability to escape liability my disclosing his intent to trade on nonpublic 
information to his source. 
The property rights theory, however, may prove overly broad, 
resulting in over-enforcement.212  For example, depending on the 
characterization of “personal benefit” and corporate purpose, a 
property rights approach may inhibit the legitimate activities of market 
analysts.  Moreover, this approach may foreclose trading based on 
nonpublic information gained through superior skill or effort. 
 
208. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1983).  
209. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). 
210. Wheatley, supra note 141, at 53–54. 
211. Id. 
212. Wheatley, supra note 141, at 54. 
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C.  Deceptive Acquisition Theory 
The “deceptive acquisition” theory has been proposed as an 
alternative to the classical and misappropriation theories on insider 
trading.213  This theory would make any person who acquired nonpublic 
information through deceptive means liable under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, in the absence of a fiduciary relationship.  Donna M. Nagy, 
Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, a 
proponent of this theory, points out that despite the Supreme Court’s 
focus on a fiduciary relationship, the plain language of the statute 
contains no such limitation and instead captures all deceptive devices 
used in connection with securities trading.  Nagy argues that Stoneridge 
Investment Partner, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., supported the 
“deceptive acquisition” theory when it  recognized conduct itself could 
be deceptive under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.214  Deceptive devices 
are not limited to misstatements or omissions made by those with a duty 
to disclose.215 To that end, computer hacking could be considered 
deceptive conduct in and of itself, despite the fact that the hacker lacked 
a preexisting fiduciary duty to the source.216  This theory addresses 
Justice Blackmun’s chief concern in Chiarella—that the Court failed to 
adequately consider the fact that Chiarella accessed nonpublic 
information that no honest investor could likewise access by legal 
means—because it reaches all scenarios where an investor capitalizes on 
nonpublic information gained solely through deceptive means.217 
There are limits to the deceptive acquisition theory.  First, it leaves 
untouchable those investors who obtain nonpublic information through 
outright theft, because theft lacks the requisite deception.218  Second, the 
deceptive acquisition theory would not prevent a misappropriator from 
escaping liability by disclosing to his source his intent to trade, because 
such disclosure eliminates any deception. 
  
 
213. Nagy, supra note 182, at 1369–70. 
214. Id. at 1370 (discussing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 
U.S. 148, 158 (2008)).  
215. Id. at 1369–70. 
216. Id. at 1370. 
217. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 247 (1980). 
218. Nagy, supra note 182, at 1372. 
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D.  Fraud on the Investors Theory 
The fraud on the investors theory was espoused by Chief Justice 
Burger in his dissenting opinion in Chiarella.  The theory prohibits all 
trades based on nonpublic information obtained through illegal means.  
Burger recognized that in the absence of a fiduciary duty, neither party 
to the business transaction has a duty to disclose information unknown 
to the other side.  The policy underlying this rule breaks down, however, 
where such information was obtained by illegal or deceptive means.  In 
other words, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should extend to any person 
who misappropriates material nonpublic information for the purposes of 
securities trading.219  A duty to abstain or disclose would thus arise even 
when the misappropriator owed no fiduciary duty to shareholders or the 
source.220 
The fraud on the investors theory of misappropriation is superior to 
the aforementioned theories as well as the fraud on the source theory 
currently followed for several reasons.  First, by premising liability on 
access through unlawful means, the fraud on investors theory captures 
all forms of misappropriation, including deceptive theft and mere theft.  
Second, the fraud on investors theory eliminates timing issues involving 
the “in connection with” requirement.221  By eliminating the breach of 
fiduciary duty requirement, the illegal conduct need not coincide with 
the securities transaction.222  Instead, the deceptive device occurs when 
the defendant fails to disclose the nonpublic information on which he 
trades to the other parties of a securities transaction.223  Third, the fraud 
on the investors theory better addresses the policies underlying the 
Section 10(b) prohibition.  The fraud on the investors theory is premised 
on the idea that misappropriation, no matter its form, defrauds 
marketplace traders224 and serves no useful function other than self-
enrichment at the expense of others.225  The best way to guarantee 
 
219. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Section 10(b)’s broad 
language, which reaches any person in any fraudulent scheme, supports this reading by 
suggesting that congressional concern was not limited to trading by corporate insiders.  Id. at 
240–41 (emphasis added). 
220. See id. 
221. Nagy, supra note 100, at 1300. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Nagy, supra note 182, at 1373 (stating that “it is insider trading’s impact on the 
securities market and the confidence of investors that provides the rationale for the Rule 10b-
5 prohibition”). 
225. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J. dissenting).  Section 10(b)’s legislative 
history shows that Congress intended section 10(b) to prohibit “those manipulative and 
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integrity of the stock markets is to eliminate all trading based on 
misappropriated nonpublic information.  Lack of a fiduciary duty does 
not change the harm done to market integrity and therefore should not 
be a requisite element of an insider trading case.  Fourth, the fraud on 
the investor theory does not reach legitimate trading activities because 
informational advantages obtained through legal channels would not 
trigger a duty to disclose.226 
Finally, Supreme Court precedent does not foreclose adoption of the 
fraud on the investor theory.  In Chiarella, the Court rejected only the 
parity of information approach, noting that the government did not 
propose the misappropriation theory in its initial appeal.  And in Dirks, 
the defendant did not misappropriate nonpublic information nor breach 
a duty of confidentiality.  Finally, in O’Hagan, the Court limited its 
analysis to the fraud on the source theory of misappropriation proposed 
by the government.  The Court did not expressly reject the broader 
fraud on the investor theory, leaving open the possibility that it adopt 
the theory in the future—much like the Chiarella Court did when it 
limited its analysis to the narrower theory argued before it.227 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit’s holding in Dorozkho reached a proper end 
through improper means by effectively combining two distinct theories 
of Section 10(b) liability into one.  It is likely that a case applying the 
affirmative misrepresentation theory of insider trading laid out in 
Dorozhko will reach the Supreme Court on appeal in the near future.  
When such a time comes, the Court should reject this newly created 
theory in favor of the fraud on the investors theory originally proposed 
by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella. 
One could argue that insider trading liability should not be extended 
to computer hackers by the judiciary.  However, this ignores the fact 
that all insider trading law, including the classical theory and “fraud on 
the source” theory, has been judicially created and that “Section 10(b) 
was designed as a catchall clause to prevent fraudulent practices.”228  
 
deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function.  S. REP. NO. 
73-792, at 6 (1934). 
226. Nagy, supra note 100, at 1303–1304. 
227. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 n.6 (1997).  The Court did not consider 
the broader theory proposed by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella because the government did 
not choose to advance such a theory and rather premised its argument on disclosure 
obligations to the source of the information.  See id. at 652. 
228. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 226. 
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Given the courts’ role in defining insider trading, the statute’s plain text, 
and the SEC’s policy goals, the Supreme Court should be permitted to 
broaden the scope of insider trading liability to capture unlawful 
conduct, such as computer hacking, despite lack of a disclosure duty.  
“The genius of insider trading law . . . is its flexibility, its ability to 
accommodate changing business practices, conditions and situations.”229  
The Court must continue to interpret Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to 
meet new challenges in maintaining the integrity of the securities 
markets. 
The bottom line is that thieves are as culpable as the fiduciary and 
should be subject to insider trading laws just the same—to maintain the 
integrity of the stock market, eliminate unfairness, and deter future 
illegal conduct. 
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